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The issue of resource allocation under share 
tenancy system has always been a fruitful source of 
controversy in economic l iterature . The Marshal l ian 
economists bel ieve that the share tenants appl y  
variable inputs less intensively than the f ixed rent 
tenants or owner operators while  the Cheung ian 
economists argue that there would be no difference in  
input intens ity across the tenure systems . This study 
exam ines the emp iri c a l  v a l i d ity of these two 
approaches , us ing evidence from the two tarai v i l l ages 
of Nepal . 
In particular , this study examines the d i fferences 
in input and output intens ities among three d i fferent 
types of plots of the paddy farmers-- owned ( A )  and 
shared ( B) plots of mixed share tenants and shared ( C )  
plots o f  pure share tenants-- for three different cases 
viii  
i . e . , A-B ,  A-C and C-B .  Mixed share tenants are farmers 
who rent in land bes ides cultivating own land . Pure 
share tenants are farmers who rent in land with no land 
of their own . The significance of these differences in 
input and output intens ities were measured by employ ing 
two test procedures . An F-test based on Hotel l ing ' s  T2 
statistic was employed to measure the s igni ficance of 
differences in input and output intensities . The second 
test , which is based on Shaban ' s  methodology , measures 
the impact of tenancy on input and output intens ities 
by i solating the pure tenancy e f fect from the total 
variation in input and output intens ities . Shaban' s 
methodol ogy wa s mod i f i e d  to incorporate two new 
v a r i a b l e s , vari ety of p addy and p l ot s i z e ,  in the 
model . 
The findings of the study reveal that the total 
differences in input and output intens ities are partly 
explained by the d i fferences in plot speci fic 
characteristics and partly by tenancy effect . Among the 
plot specific characteristics , plot s i z e  is found to be 
the most important variable in account ing for the 
d i fferences in input and output intensities . 
The results of the study also indicate that the 
share tenants ( plots B and C) apply inputs less 
intens ively than the owner operators ( plot A) . within 
sharecropping , the pure share tenants ( plot C) use more 
ix 
non-shared inputs compared to the mixed share tenants 
( plot B ) . 
After accounting for the impact of plot siz e ,  soil 
qua l ity and the vari ety of paddy , the impact o f  
sharecropping i s  to use lower inputs and produce lower 
output . The impact o f  sharecropp ing i s  h ig h l y  
s i gn i f icant , e sp ec i a l l y  i n  t h e  case  o f  non - shared 
inputs such as compost , bu l l ock power and f am i l y  
labour . These findings support the Marshal l ian school 
in the sharecropping controversy . This is consistent 
with Shaban's conclusion . 
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Ekonomi dan Pengurusan 
Isu alokasi sumber di bawah si stem sewa kongsi 
selalu menj adi punca kontroversi yang berguna dalam 
penu l i san ekonomi . Ahl i - ah l i  ekon om i  Ma r s ha l l i a n  
berpendapat bahawa penyewa berkongsi menggunakan input 
b e rubah yang kurang d a r i pada penyewa tetap a tau 
pemi l i k, manaka l a  ah l i -ahl i ekonomi cheungian pul a 
berpendapat b ahawa t idak ada perbe z a a n  d i  d a l am 
penggunaan input bagi kesemua sistem sewa . Kaj ian ini 
mendalami kedua-dua perdebatan di atas melalui kaj ian 
empirikal dengan menggunakan bukti kajian daripada dua 
buah kampung lembah di Nepal . 
Secara terper inci , kaj i a n  i n i  mel ihat pada 
perbezaan antara intensiti input dan output di kalangan 
tiga jen i s  petan i pad i: pem i l ik petak tul en ( A ) , 
pemi l ik kongs i ( B )  dan penyewa tulen ( C ) , iaitu A-B , 
A-C dan C-B .  Penyewa kongsi campuran adalah petani yang 
xi 
menyewa ladang d i  samp ing mengusahakan ladang sendiri . 
Penyewa kongsi tulen adalah petani yang menyewa ladang 
dan tidak mempunyai ladang send iri . Uj ian s igni f ikan 
bagi penggunaan intensiti input dan output telah diukur 
me l a l u i  dua pros edur ujian . Uj ian-F berdasarkan 
statistic T2 Rotel l ing telah digunakan untuk mengukur 
perbezaan signi f ikan di dalam intensiti-intensiti input 
dan output. Uj i a n  kedua yang berdas arkan kepada 
metodologi yang t e l ah d i gunakan ol eh Shaban untuk 
mengukur kesan sewaan ke atas intens iti-intens iti input 
dan output dengan menga s ingkan kesan s ewaan tu l e n  
daripada jumlah varias i intens iti- intens iti i nput dan 
output . Metodologi Shaban telah d iubahsuaikan dengan 
memasukkan dua angkubah yang baru ia itu jenis padi dan 
sai z petak di dalam model kajian ini . 
Dari kaj i a n  i n i  k i  ta mendap a t i  b ah awa j uml a h  
perb e z aan d a l am i ntens i t i  i nput d a n  output 
sebahagiannya disebabkan oleh perbez aan ciri spes i f ik 
petak dan sebahagiannya disebabkan oleh kesan sewaan . 
Di kal angan c i r i -c i r i  spes i f ik peta k , s a i z  petak 
merupakan angkubah yang mustahak b a g i  mendapatkan 
perbezaan dalam int�nsiti input dan output . 
Keputusan kaj ian ini menunjukkan bahawa penyewa 
kongs i ( petak B dan C )  menggunakan kurang intens iti 
input daripada pengusaha tanah sendiri ( petak A) . Dal am 
s i stem s ewaan, penyewa tu len ( p etak C )  menggunakan 
xii 
lebih banyak input sendiri dibandingkan dengan penyewa 
campuran ( petak B )  . 
Setelah mengambilkira kesan saiz petak , kual iti 
tanah dan j enis padi , didapa ti tanaman kongs i telah 
menyebabkan penggunaan input yang kurang dan output 
yang rendah . Kesan ta naman kongs i ad a l ah t ingg i 
s ign i f ikanan t erutama untuk kes i nput yang t idak 
d iko ngsi  s eperti kompos , kua sa l embu dan buruh 
keluarga . Keputusan kaj ian ini telah menyokong pendapat 
sekol ah Marshal lian dalam kontrovers i tanaman kongsi . 
K a j  i an i n i  j ug a  kons i sten dengan keputu s a n  yang 




An overview of Agriculture sector of Nepal 
Agricul ture plays a maj or role in the Nepalese 
economy . Agriculture provides 92 percent of employment , 
6 1  percent of GOP and 80 percent o f  export earnings 
( H i s  Maj esty ' s Government ( HMG) /Nep al , 199 1 )  . 
Cultivation of food and cash crops is the basic form 
o f  agriculture in Nepal . Maj or food crops are paddy , 
ma i z e , wheat , barley and millet , wh ile c a s h  crops 
incl ude sugar-cane , o i l  seed s , tobacco , j ute and 
potato . 
The total cuI ti vated area in 1988 was 3 , 1 69 , 0 0 0  
ha , while the area covered by the food crops alone was 
2 , 888 , 0 0 0  ha (9 1 . 13 percent ) . Paddy was the principal 
food crop both in terms of total cropped area (wh ich 
was about 50 percent of total cropped area of principal 
food crops in 1988) and output produced. In 1988, paddy 
contributed to about 63 percent of total principal food 




the increased level o f  investment in 
infrastructure in previous seven 
development plans ( 1956-199 0 )  and the 
implementation of land reform programme in 19 6 4  with 
1 
2 
the sole obj ecti ve of developing the agri culture 
se ctor , the per forma nce o f  the agriculture s e ctor , 
however , had not been very encoura g i n g . The 
productivity index of principal food crops rema ined 
stagnant during the fiscal years 1 9 7 6/ 7 7  to 1 9 8 7 / 8 8  at 
its 1 9 7 4/75 level . Although there appeared a sl ight 
improv ement i n  the per formance o f  the  agr i cu l ture 
sector a fter the fiscal year 1 9 8 7/ 8 8 , it had not yet 
been ab l e  to ra i s e  the per c a p i t a  a g r i c u l tural 
production of  the country ( HMG/Nepal , 1 9 9 1 ) . 
I nadequate supply o f  modern i nputs , l ack o f  
marketing services , small  and fragmented hold ing s i z e  
and l ow level of l iteracy rate among the farmers are 
often reported as the reasons f or such b l eak 
performance of the Nepalese agriculture ( Pandey , 1 9 8 7 : 
5 2 3 - 2 4 ) . An adequate supp l y  o f  such agr icul tura l 
infrastructure , however , does not ensure an increase in  
productivity . The farm productivity is  often bel ieved 
to be determined by the motivation of the farmers to 
apply avai lable resources opt imal ly . Therefore , various 
efforts have also been made to provide incentives to 
the actual til lers through implementing l and-to-the­
t i l l er l e g i s l at ions . I n  t h i s  respect , v a r i ou s  
institutions involved i n  Nepalese land tenure systems 
before and a fter 1951 are d iscussed in the fol lowing 
sections . 
3 
Land Tenure system in Nepal 
Land Tenure system Before 1951 
Traditional ly, land in Nepal belongs to the state . 
The s tate had used l and t o  c o n s o l idate i t s  p ower , 
mainta in its functionaries , 
friends . Land grants were 
and please relatives and 
g iven to individual s  and 
institutions on various occasions and wi th various 
cond i t ions . Land was  a l s o  granted to g overnment 
employees in l ieu o f  cash emoluments ( Regmi , 1 9 7 6 ) . 
The pre-reform l and tenure systems o f  Nepal were 
genera l ly class i fied as Raikar , Birta , Jagir ,  Rakam , 
Rajya , Guthi and Kipat . Birta , Jagir , Rakam and Rajya 
l and tenure systems were abolished and do not exist in 
the present system . The Raikar tenure system was a form 
o f  state l andlord i sm . Under th is t enure , l an d  was 
granted to individual s  upon payment of a f ixed annual 
revenue ( land tax) . This Ra ikar land was inheritable , 
transferable and divisible as l ong as the occupancy 
rights rema ined intact . The Ra ikar system wa s the 
predom inant tenur i a l  f orm wh ich accounted for 5 0  
percent of total tenanted l and in the country ( Ram 
Bahadur , 1 98 6 :  2 ) . 
Birta , Jagir , Rajya and Rakam tenurial forms 
emerged through the l and grants provided by the state 
to various individuals . The Birta land was the most 
privil eged form of l and tenure ( Regmi , 1 9 7 6: 2 2 - 4 5 ) .  
4 
Birta holders had rights to possess, occupy, transfer , 
and mortgage . The B i rta sy stem a cc ounted for 3 6 . 3  
percent of total tenanted land ( Zaman , 1973 ) .  
The Jagi r tenurial form was the land grant 
provided by the state to its functionaries in lieu of 
cash emoluments . Mostly , rights of the awardees were 
t ime-bound and l imited to the appropriation of revenue . 
The Rakam system was the l and g ra nt prov i d ed for 
speci fic j obs done such as those o f  carpenters, brick 
layers and mail  carriers ( Ram Bahadur , 198 6 : 2 2 ) . 
The Rajya land tenure s y st em was a f o rm o f  
princely state award g iven to the royal family members 
and relatives . This tenure system emerged a fter the 
uni fication of Nepal , which was d iv ided into 2 2  states , 
ruled by independent monarchs . Even a fter uni fi cation, 
these monarchs were allowed to reta in the ownership o f  
t h e  l a n d  w ith i n  the i r  territory u p o n  p ayment o f  a 
nominal tax as a token o f  al legiance to the central 
authority in Kathmandu ( Koira1a , 1987 : 4 ) . 
The land grant system was initiated by the state 
to bring new land into cultivation , especially in the 
tarai ( plain area ) region which was mainly covered by 
forests , and the climatic condit i on in this region was 
not considered suitable for permanent settlement unt il 
the malaria eradicat ion programme was launched in  the 
late 1 9 5 0s . Such grants were basically prov ided to 
5 
"government emp l oyees ,  members o f  the n ob ility and 
other persons in favour" ( Feldman and Fournier , 1976: 
4 50)  • 
The Guthi  system emerged from rel i g i ou s  
considerations , under which the ownership o f  land was 
granted to the temples , monasteries and other rel igious 
and philanthropic institut ions . This l and was usua l ly 
cultivated by individual tillers who were required to 
pay fixed amount of rent , mostly in kind . Before the 
land reform , Guthi land comprised of 2 percent of total 
cu l t ivated l and ( Ram Bahadur , 1 9 86: 2 )  a nd was 
inheritab l e , d iv i s ib l e  and tra n s f erab l e  a t  the 
occupancy level . 
Kipat was a communal land tenure system , which 
accounted for 4 percent of tenanted l and ( Ram Bahadur , 
1986: 2 ) . Its sale outs ide the Limbu community was 
prohibited by law .  This l and was a lso taxed by the 
state as Raikar land ( Pant and Jain , 1969: 49). 
These different l and tenure systems gave rise to 
complex institutional mechanisms . The various interest 
groups involved in these mechanisms were : i )  the state 
and its agents ( Talukdar or Z imawala in  the h i l l s  and 
Z a m i ndar and his a s s i s tant s , Patawa r i s , in t a ra i 
region ) , who were authorised by the state to collect 
revenue ; i i )  intermediate landl ords and their managers ; 
and i i i )  the actual tillers, who till the land mostly 
6 
as a sharecroppers ( Pant and Jain , 1969 : 50) . None of  
the parties involved i n  this system pa id much attention 
to farm improvement . Farm productivity was low and 
erratic . There were evidences when even the landlords 
were unable to pay l and tax from the ir share of farm 
produce. As a result ,  their land was confiscated by the 
government ( Feldman and Fournier, 197 6 ) . 
I n  19 6 1 ,  about 4 6  percent o f  the total households 
owned only 10 percent of the total cultivated area 
whereas the top 8 percent households owned nearly 4 0  
percent ( Central Bureau o f  statistics ( CBS ) , 198 5 ) . 
Those bottom 4 6  percent o f  the households farmed plots 
of less than 0 . 5  ha , which was not sufficient to meet 
even their bare necess ities ( Seddon , 1987 : 119 ) . The 
l and d i stribut i on was  h ighly skewed . More over , the 
degree o f  l and concentrat ion was h i gher i n  t a ra i 
compared to hilly region ( Feldman and Fournier , 19 7 6 ) . 
Land Tenure system After 1951 
With the advent o f  democracy in 19 5 1 ,  various 
measures were taken to regularise the land market in 
Nepal . The first step in this respect was taken in 19 5 1  
when Tenancy Rights Security Act was passed . Throughout 
the decade of 19 5 0 s  and early 196 0s various attempts 
were made to adopt agrarian reform measures . The Land 
Act of 19 5 7  made legal provis ions for the security o f  
tenancy and eviction , and exempted tenants from unpaid 
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labour services and other extra levies . The amendment 
to The Land Act in 1959  made tenancy rights heritable 
and transferable . 
Intermediate tenurial arrangements such as Jagir,  
Birta , Rajya , and Rakam were abol ished in 19 52,  1 9 59, 
19 6 1  and 19 6 3 ,  respective l y . The B i rta l and was 
converted into Ra ikar and tenancy right was g iven to 
the actual til lers . According to Zaman ( 19 7 3 ) ,  l ess 
than 10 percent o f  total cultivated area was a ffected 
by these reforms . 
Final ly , a comprehens ive land reform programme was 
impl emented in 1 9 6 4  with the p r omu l ga t i on and 
enforcement of Land Act , 1964  and Land Rules , 1 9 6 4 . The 
maj or obj ectives of the Land Reform Programme include: 
i )  d iversion of surplus resources from land to other 
productive sectors to accelerate economic development ; 
i i )  equitable distribution o f  land ; and i i i )  improve 
l iv ing standards of real tillers through dissemination 
o f  technology . 
The land reform o f  1 9 6 4  abol ished the Z amindari 
and other intermediary interests in l and . It fixed l and 
ceil ings for the l andlords as wel l  as the tenants ( for 
the landlords: 18 . 4  ha , 4 . 9 1 ha and 3 . 1  ha and for the 
tenants: 2 . 5  ha , 1 . 0  ha and 0 . 5 0 ha in  tara i , h i l l  and 
Kathmandu vall ey I respect i v e l y ) .  The l a nd r e f orm 
programme also f ixed the rent at a max imum o f  5 0  
8 
percent of gross produce and made l egal provis ions for 
tenancy rights. Under this programme , tenancy rights 
were provided to all tenants who had been till ing the 
land for at least one main crop . 
In subsequent amendments ,  the absolute amount of 
rent payable to the landlords was fixed for different 
categories of 
rent app l i ed 
l ands. However , thi s  officially fixed 
only for 2 7  d i s t r i ct s . For oth e r  
d istricts , it was fixed at a maximum of 5 0  percent of 
the produce from the main crop . The amount of rent 
f ixed by the government on such rented lands varied 
between districts and it was lower than the amount paid 
by non-registered tenants . For Kathmandu Val ley , it was 
about one fourth of ma in crop produced in a year ( Ram 
Bahadur , 19 8 6 : 1 7 ) . 
The structure of land tenure system a fter the 
impl ementat ion of l and r e f orm p rogramme in 1 9 6 4 , 
cons ists of Ra ikar , Kipat and Guth i . The Ra ikar land 
comprises of 9 4  percent of the total cUltivated area, 
while  Kipat and Guthi land are about 4 and 2 percent 
respectively ( Zaman , 197 3 ) . 
Even after the implementation of land reform 
programme in 19 64 , the degree of inequal ity in land 
ownership has not yet decl ined . Moreover , the number of 
famil ies hol ding uneconomic size  of l and has increased 
from 4 6  percent in 1 9 6 1  to about 56 percent in 19 71 
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( CBS , 1985 ) . The share o f  these 56 percent famil ies in 
the total cultivated land is merely 12 percent while 
the top 6 percent famil ies owned about 44 percent . Most 
of these large holders are absentee l andlords who lease 
out the ir land to the sharecroppers ( As ian Development 
Bank/His Maj esty ' s  Government/Nepal , 1982: 102) . 
Incidence of Tenancy and Sharecropping 
There is a lack of rel iable statistics on the 
frequency of various tenancy groups in Nepal . According 
to the records in the Department of Land Reform , there 
were about 560,0 0 0  tenants during land reform , of whi ch 
318,5 0 0  tenants received tenancy certificates . Z aman 
(1973) estimated that there were 460,0 0 0  tenants in 
1971 . A survey conducted by Land Reform Department in 
1972 reported that 40 percent of tenants were left out 
during the initial process of tenant identi fication by 
the programme . 
Census report published by the Central Bureau of 
s t at i st i cs (1985 ) indi cates that the i nc i d en c e  o f  
tenancy is decl ining over time both in terms o f  tenant 
households as wel l  as area under tenancy . In 1961, 25.3 
percent o f  total holdings was under tenancy and 7 . 1  
percent of the total households were tenants , but in 
1981 only 6 percent of total holdings was under tenancy 
and tenant households were 1. 5 percent ( Bista , 1989: 
11) • 
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since the Land Re form Programme was not susta ined 
for long, the number as well as area under formal 
tenancy is dwindl ing over time through legal and 
illegal eviction . Koirala (1987: 9 )  reported that 60 
percent of the cases filed in Dhanusha District Land 
Reform Off ice between 1965/66 and 1984/85 were against 
the landlords who attempted to evict their tenants . He 
also reports that some of the tenants were legally 
evicted through court orders . 
Even though the incidence o f  recorded tenancy is  
decreasing , the extent o f  actual tenancy ( formal and 
informal ) in Nepal is bel ieved to be much higher than 
recorded in census reports . Z aman (1973 ) found that 
about 32 percent of the farm famil ies lease in land for 
farming purposes . The Center for Development Studies 
(1980 ) had reported that 55 percent of farms in  Nepal 
were owner operated , 21 p ercent owner -cum-tenant 
operated , 11 percent tenant operated and 13 percent 
unc l a s s i f i ed ( c �ted in Pant , 1987: 3) . Lohan i and 
Khadka (1981) found that 72 percent tenant households 
in Chitawan and 94 percent tenant households in Tanahu 
were informal tenants . 
In the fiscal year 1982/83, an attempt was made to 
record tenants left out by the Land Reform Programme 
and others who became tenant in the subsequent years . 
However , this effort fizz led out within a month due to 
the strong opposition from the landed class . 
11 
The share of formal share tenancy in total area 
under tenancy is also decreas ing over census years 
( Table 1 ) . It decreased from 61 percent in 1961 to 49 
percent in 1981 . Moreover , the incidence o f  formal 
share tenancy in tarai region is higher than in hill 
region . Even in the tarai region , the total area under 
share tenancy is decreas ing over time . While in the 
census year 1961, 72 percent of the total area under 
tenancy in the tarai region was sharecropped , it was 
only 54 percent in 1981 . 
Table 1 
Regional Distribution o f  Sharecropped Area ('0 0 0  ha ) 
Year 1961 1971 1981 
----------- ---------- -----------
Region Area % Area � 0 Area � 0 
Hill 18 21 . 0 12 29 . 0  9 30 . 0  
Tarai 243 72 . 0  161 68 . 0  63 54 . 0  
Nepal 261 61 . 0  173 62 . 0  72 49 . 0  
Source : Ramesh Bista , 1989: 8-9 . 
The actual incidence o f  share tenancy is bel ieved 
to be much higher than recorded in census reports . In a 
case study of Nemuwatole vil lage of Dhanusa district 
in Nepal , Pant (1987: 7)  found that 69 percent tenants 
are renting land on a crop sharing bas i s . 
statement o f  Problem 
Land is the maj or productive resource o f  Nepal . 
More than 90 percent of people earn the ir l iving from 
